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Humanizing Foreign Assistance:
Attitudes Toward and Contact with the World Bank

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Humanizing Foreign Assistance:
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Humanizing Foreign Assistance:
Attitudes Toward and Contact with the World Bank

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How do recipients of foreign assistance regard what they receive? Although assistance provides presumably life-saving or life-improving goods and services, it also entails unsavory dynamics that can frustrate the relationship between donors and recipients. I theorize that contact with foreign-assistance workers — i.e., people who design or deliver foreign assistance — can improve the relationship between donor and client. Buttressed by intergroup-contact and infrahumanization theories, I posit this improvement stems from a humanizing effect. The contact transforms what was an abstract bureaucracy into a concrete, embodied, personal experience. I examine the implications of this theory in the context of the World Bank, using individual-level survey data from the organization's 2012-2016 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program and from the 2002-2003 Afrobarometer series. I find a positive relationship between contact with and attitudes toward the World Bank in the COS data and between membership in a community-development association (to proxy for contact) and attitudes toward the World Bank in the Afrobarometer data. Broadly, this paper is an exploration of the quotidian, routine operations and their effects on the legitimacy and impact of foreign assistance.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Foreign assistance has been simultaneously celebrated for its efficacy, disregarded for its impotence, and vilified for its hubris. These different, competing assessments share an interest in the effects of foreign assistance and an appreciation of the processes that beget them. By "foreign assistance," I mean intervention by foreign parties intended to improve human existence abroad, however vaguely and broadly defined. This includes peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in post-conflict areas, development assistance that seeks to build economic and institutional capacities, and humanitarian aid in response to acute crises. It encompasses the work of national aid agencies, international organizations (IOs), and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

One way to understand the effects of foreign assistance and the processes that beget them appreciates the voices and perspectives of the people intimately involved in the process: foreign-assistance workers and recipients (e.g., Anderson, Brown, & Jean, 2012; Dijkzeul & Wakenge, 2010; Feldman, 2017). In identifying foreign-assistance workers as entry points, researchers have explicitly recognized that these workers' insights and experiences can speak to the constraints, incentives, and motivations that shape their work. Similarly, asking recipients about their perspectives on what they receive can add to our understanding in a number of ways. If recipients' lives are the ones for whom foreign assistance is supposed to improve, their assessments can convey if it is working and why or why not. Asking recipients can also bypass the blinders that govern how foreign-assistance workers assess their work and can unearth tensions that would otherwise go unnoticed (World Bank Group, 2015). Official reports and assessments may neglect to disclose the unsavory but chronic features of foreign assistance (Camfield, Duvendack, & Palmer-Jones, 2014; Carneiro & Garbero, 2018; Honig, 2018; Fast, 2014: 56), which means these reports often miss important components of the foreign-assistance experience. Seeking information from the parties that participate in and make possible foreign assistance can fill in the gaps of what is unintentionally overlooked or intentionally excluded.

In line with this approach, I assume that the attitudes and assessments of recipients capture something

about foreign assistance. Theoretically, I argue that the everyday, on-the-ground interactions that recipients have with foreign-assistance workers can shape how the former regard the intervention.[1] Buttressed by work on intergroup contact and infrahumanization, I posit that the contact between foreign-assistance workers and recipients provides organic opportunities for groups to regard the other as equally human, equipped with secondary emotions like remorse, regret, love, and hope, which are what people tend to view as distinctly human (Leyens et al., 2000). Next, I argue that foreign-assistance workers, in representing the organizations for which they work, render assistance a concrete, embodied, and personal experience for recipients through contact with them. A positive, humanization-inducing contact can improve attitudes toward the IOs for which the foreign-assistance worker works because the IOs are known through their workers.

To evaluate this theory, I use 2012-2016 data from the World Bank Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, which solicits opinions from the individuals who work, in different capacities and to varying degrees, with the World Bank Group.[2] Examples of this include positions in national or local governments, bilateral or multilateral aid agencies, faith-based groups, the media, academia, among others. These data have the potential to broaden our understanding of the donor-recipient relationship by tapping into the opinions of individuals who work within client countries. Through their work, these individuals see and can speak to the routine and seemingly unremarkable aspects of foreign assistance that do not appear in official reports. Admittedly, the World Bank has been the subject of numerous examinations. These have explored the policies it pushes (Craig & Porter, 2003; Goldman, 2005; Stein, 2008, 2011; Woods, 2006), organizational culture (Weaver, 2008), institutional reform (Nielson & Tierney, 2003), and issues with accountability (Fox & Brown, 1998; Kim, 2011), for examples. Yet the data from the COS Program examined here provide a view of the World Bank from a population of people who, to varying degrees, have observed the organization's work and have engaged with its employees. I also examine data from the 2002-2003 Afrobarometer in light of my theory. These individual-level data include residents of 15 countries in Africa. I utilize this survey's inclusion of a question of membership in community-development associations (CDAs). Leveraging the observation that contact with the World Bank varies by CDA membership, I examine an implication of my theory: Ratings of the World Bank should vary according to CDA membership (official leader, active member, and inactive or nonmembers) because contact with the IO varies by membership status.

The paper proceeds as follows. I first review existing work on attitudes toward foreign assistance, par-

[1] This is not to be confused with what has been called the "everyday turn" of peacebuilding scholarship, which relies on "emancipatory" approaches and privileges the "local" in an attempt to challenge the liberal-peace paradigm that underpins peacebuilding efforts (see Randazzo, 2016). I am not referring to this scholarly interest in the local, emancipatory approach — curiously described as "everyday" — when I use that word to describe an interaction. The everyday is experienced by all parties; it is not exclusive to the marginalized.

[2] Technically, the World Bank Group comprises five organizations; two of these work in development for the world's poorest: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). These two constituent parts make up what is colloquially known as the World Bank.

titioning the literature into two ways of thinking about how aid is received: that assistance is largely liked, and that assistance is largely disliked. I then detail my theory, focusing on intergroup contact, the power of the everyday interactions for shaping people's attitudes, and the link between IOs and the people who work in them. Next, I present the data and research methodology, evaluate the findings, and conclude by reflecting on what this means for foreign assistance, international legitimacy, and ways of engaging.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Two competing ideas provide explanations for how residents in countries receiving assistance perceive what they get. The first suggests that it is largely welcomed, accompanied by a seemingly straightforward notion: Foreign assistance supplies people in precarious circumstances with much-needed materials and support. The second idea recognizes that a power dynamic exists between foreign-assistance workers and recipients. It acknowledges the possibility that recipients feel annoyed, aggrieved, or neglected by particular features of this power dynamic, and it considers that recipient assessments weigh more than just material benefits. I explore each in turn.

2.1 Why Assistance is Liked

There are reasons why recipients of assistance like what they receive. At its core, foreign assistance brings funds, person-power, and support to places struggling with underdevelopment and conflict; plainly put, assistance infuses resources into precarious spaces. This aid-as-resource-infusion highlights the fact that aid brings development deliverables to recipients.[1] These development deliverables include roads, schools, and sanitation services among many others, as well as the capacity-building tools to sustain them. In post-conflict peacebuilding, people want to transform a tenuous peace into a sustainable one, and they want to harness the relatively abundant resources of the international community to do so. Girod (2012) proposes a theory about why post-conflict reconstruction fails or succeeds; in naming her theory the nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis, she plainly puts just why foreign assistance may be liked: There is a need, a *desperation*, for what foreign assistance can offer.

This idea that communities hold assistance in high regards, on average, because it supplies deeply needed things appears in some works on foreign assistance. In writing on credit claiming among elites in recipient

[1] However, note that unfinished projects frequent the international-development landscape (Williams, 2017).

countries, Cruz and Schneider (2017) comment, "That people in communities which obtain foreign aid projects tend to be favorably disposed to them is straight-forward and uncontroversial" (Cruz & Schneider, 2017: 398). Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018) ran an experiment in Bangladesh, hypothesizing that recipients will hold more favorable views of the benefactor if they can recognize the source of their aid. In their own words, "The perception that the donor cares about the aid-receiving country and its people should generate diffuse positive affect toward the donor" (Dietrich, Mahmud, & Winters, 2018: 135-136; see also Goldsmith, Horiuchi, & Wood, 2014). While they hypothesize rather than assume a positive relationship between aid visibility and recipient attitudes, Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters do not articulate why a negative relationship could obtain. A related sentiment — that donors want recipients to "know whom to thank" (Hattori, 2001: 647) — is evinced in the widespread use of branding by aid organizations on the projects they fund.[2] Why would these organizations make it a policy to put their name on the projects if they think recipient communities dislike the intervention?

Findley et al. (2017) offer theoretical insight and empirical evidence as to why recipients may harbor positive feelings toward foreign assistance. They propose that citizens will prefer external aid (e.g., from the U.S., China, World Bank, African Development Bank) because this type is thought to be inaccessible to domestic elites who, if it were accessible, would capture and funnel it for their own purposes. This suggests that, even if the aid signifies an imposing, paternalistic, or visibly unequal exchange (three possibilities I explore next), citizens prefer it over projects from their own governments. In other words, foreign assistance may be liked because it offers an alternative to government-sponsored projects when the government has given its citizens reasons to distrust it.

Scholars, in arguing ways that recipients come to dislike assistance, demonstrate ways that recipients may like and want assistance. Consider that projects introduce resources that generate tension (Barron, Diprose, & Woolcock, 2011, chapter 4). Implicit in this is that recipients desire to secure the resources that development workers introduce; fights occur among potential recipients because one party covets another party's funding receipt. Thus, the assistance is desired; the limited amount of it is what recipients dislike. Above all, recipient communities often contain a multitude of actors. Different actors have different preferences; assistance, depending on its fungibility, can aid them in realizing these preferences.

[2]For example, the aid agency of the United States (USAID) is staffed with "branding champions," has specific and detailed instructions for how and where the USAID logo can be applied, and explicitly does this to make beneficiaries aware of the source (see `https://www.usaid.gov/branding`). Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018) demonstrate, however, that donor visibility and the effectiveness of development branding are limited. Similarly, Dunn (2017) calls into the question the extent to which recipients can differentiate government-provided aid from foreign-provided aid, let alone differentiate what each foreign agency and organization provided (Dunn, 2017: 78, 99-100; see also Autesserre, 2014: 177).

2.2 Why Assistance is Disliked

Here, I explore the possibility that foreign assistance is disliked, focusing on three features of the donor-recipient dynamic: imposition, paternalism, and visible inequality. The following review, though detailed, excludes other reasons: For instance, a common assessment among recipients is that the assistance they receive has not done enough to change their living conditions (e.g., Donini, 2007; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012) or that it fuels corruption through subcontracting and procurement (e.g., Fishstein & Wilder, 2012). Also, foreign assistance often gives the impression of descending then departing capriciously (Anderson, Brown, & Jean, 2012: 26; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012: 51; McMahon, 2017).

2.2.1 Imposition

First, foreign assistance generally necessitates some form of imposition. This imposition can manifest in formal conditions that donors attach to their assistance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, for example, require struggling countries to commit to macroeconomic and institutional reforms in order to receive assistance (see Bogetić & Smets, 2017; Hermes & Lensink, 2001; Woods, 2006: 70-72). Imposition can also appear informally as templates (also called toolkits), or pre-fashioned modalities imported from previous projects and disparate contexts. Foreign-assistance workers rely on templates because they distill the complexity of the issue at hand into something legible and tractable for foreign-assistance workers (cf. Duina, 2010). They provide order and flow for problem assessment, structuring and disciplining thought to make sense of the circumstances and to plot a plan to change them. Templates also allow past practices to inform current approaches so that foreign-assistance planners and implementers do not have to reinvent strategies for every crisis. Yet templates do not often accord with the goals, realities, or possibilities on the ground because they neglect, by design, specifics of a place and problem, "search[ing] for broad generalizable standards at the slight of the particular" (Barnett, 2016: 142). They trade texture for tractability in order to produce a workable course of action; this can also bring about inappropriate and ineffective outcomes.

Post-conflict humanitarian efforts in the Caucasus are a striking instance of this. Following the five-day war of 2008 in South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia, international agencies devoted resources to water and infant-feeding programs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) even though, as Dunn explains, "[b]reastfeeding in Georgia was widely accepted, formula remained easily available throughout the crisis, and there was high-quality water in all the places IDPs were placed" (Dunn, 2017: 82). Imported from previous interventions in African countries without regard for the current context, these templates for action in post-conflict zones had consequences: "[A] model based on a totally different context was applied to Georgia and hundreds of thousands of dollars in aid money was devoted to a problem that never existed. Meanwhile

there were other problems for which no rules of thumb had been developed, such as diabetes in early IDPs living on high-glycemic-index bread, macaroni, and sugar delivered to them by the World Food Programme" (Dunn, 2017: 82). Additionally, recipients of micro-finance projects in Afghanistan reported negative views of them, "consistently criticizing them as un-Islamic because they collected excessive interest" (Fishstein, 2010: 39). The micro-finance approach, which has been pursued elsewhere (e.g., Robinson, 2001), may work when applied to circumstances that call for it — i.e., when it is germane to the realities on the ground so that recipients desire to implement it. Therefore, the Georgian and Afghan examples highlight how templates, when applied devoid of context, can lead to poorly appropriated funds and recipient resistance.[3]

These conditions and templates hail from a particular system — the existing constellation of IOs and the powerful countries that influence them — and inherit a particular past. The disdain people hold for powerful states bleeds into their perception of the IOs in which these states yield power (Johnson, 2011), and much of foreign assistance occurs through IOs. Thus, if recipients dislike powerful states because they impose and interfere, they may view IOs (and the assistance they provide) as imposing and interfering. Alternatively stated, there is an imposition implied by IOs: Institutions created and led by powerful states can dictate what and how states provide for their citizens through foreign assistance. We also need to consider the particular past of international intervention. Claims abound about the (neo)colonial or (neo)imperial feel of today's foreign assistance, identifying the parallels between imperial operations of the past and foreign assistance of the present (Hewitt, 2009; Kothari, 2006). Razack (2004) links peacekeeping operations to a "new civilizing mission" (Razack, 2004: 49), which comes from the same logic of colonialism: Foreigners can descend on an area, "discipline" the inhabitants, and dictate the terms of this disciplining. Both development and colonialism, this line of thought goes, are articulations of foreign power abroad, motivated by racial ideas and intended to reconfigure spaces according to the designs of the foreigner.

Here, it is helpful to think of colonialism in terms of collective memory, which is a shared understanding and (re)telling of past experiences, passed down through generations and existing explicitly or implicitly in cultural references (See Olick & Robbins, 1998, for a review of collective memory). Olick and Robbins cite personal communication with Barry Schwartz, who compellingly describes collective memory as "both a mirror and a lamp — a model of and a model for society" (Schwartz, cited in Olick & Robbins, 1998: 124). In postcolonial spaces, a collective memory of colonialism shapes individuals' identities and orientations toward others. Schwartz's dual metaphor of the mirror and the lamp highlights that collective memory not only

[3]Examples of this abound. Organizing elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrates this tendency. Although violence had yet to abate in eastern provinces of the country and the vast majority of rural residents were unaware of the purpose of the elections, peacebuilding efforts focused on elections as the way to commence the new peace. Elections were understood as the natural focus of the intervention because elections had been implemented in other precarious places and election specialists were readily available to enter the country and implement them (Autesserre, 2010: 102-114, 239-243). See Donais (2009) for more on imposition, local ownership, and peacebuilding. On the topic of institutional reform, Evans (2004) discusses how blueprints can lead to poor fit, which he calls "institutional monocropping."

makes the past and self legible (a mirror); it also is how present experiences and practices are evaluated (the lamp). So, one need not have endured a *personal* experience of colonization to feel sensitive about colonialism, imperialism, and imposition. Living in a *post*colonial space may spawn a wariness to foreign assistance as a way to jealously guard sovereignty (Menon, 2016: 57). Alternatively put, the collective memory of colonialism can render state sovereignty particularly salient.

Additionally, foreign assistance can be seen as a strategic geopolitical tool by recipients, reinforcing existing suspicions or generating new ones (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010). Instead of having the intended effect of "winning hearts and minds," foreign assistance can provoke the opposite attitude because recipients can sense what they presume to be the donors' true intentions (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 52). It is well documented that foreign assistance often comes for reasons other than recipient need.[4] Recipients may view the assistance as generosity masking the donors' instrumental goals. According to recent work, today's instrumental goals include thwarting immigration from places experiencing political upheaval (Bermeo & Leblang, 2015). Bermeo (2017) argues that foreign-aid allocation in the post-2001 world is best understood as "targeted, self-interested development" (Bermeo, 2017: 735-736). Foreign assistance tries to improve the circumstances besetting recipients, which transcend boundaries and promise spillover effects, so that donors do not have to address the repercussions. They care about development to the extent that the transboundary issues (e.g., terrorism, climate change) will affect donors. Thus, recipients may conclude that what they receive is not primarily intended for their benefit; it has less to do with them than it does with the people providing it. In other words, foreign assistance may seem to be a strategic means to a selfish end, not an honest end in and of itself.

Importantly, then, to understand attitudes toward assistance and the possibility that the assistance will look like imposition, it must be situated in the particular systems and histories of the recipients and foreign-assistance workers (Hattori, 2001; Razack, 2004). As Crewe and Harrison (1998) articulate, "A memory of previous interventions, whether colonial or government- or donor-supported development projects, has a profound influence on the way in which local people respond to the latest one" (135).

Yet Autesserre (2014) argues that it is not necessarily even the flavor of intervention that breeds disdain. "[T]he very act of imposition," before or beyond the ideological content of the intervention can be enough to stir resentment or contestation (Autesserre, 2014: 53).[5] In sum, the source of client-country disdain need not hail from the character of the intervention but, instead, from the imposing nature of it. So, recipients

[4]On foreign aid, see Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Bermeo (2011), for examples. On humanitarian assistance, see Fink and Redaelli (2011) and Francken, Minten, and Swinnen (2012). On motivations for sending peacekeepers, see Bellamy and Williams (2013).

[5]This point is especially relevant to IOs such as the IMF and the World Bank, which, in recent years, have at least proclaimed to been less wedded to neoliberal prescriptions, although some allege that reforms are only cosmetic and ceremonial (e.g., Kentikelenis, Stubbs, & King, 2016).

may dislike the notion and practice of foreign imposition to the extent that it conditions assistance in oft-unchallenged but problematic ways, adopts previous practices and applies them without meaningfully adapting them, or prescribes ways forward that neglect the realities of the past.

2.2.2 Paternalism

Another reason why citizens in recipient countries may dislike foreign aid pertains to paternalism, or "a relationship that makes the subordinate's development into a self-conscious project pursued by a directive and supervisory authority" (Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011: 24). It is "the mixture of emancipation and domination that inhabit everyday practices of humanitarian governance" (Barnett, 2017: 5). Foreign assistance occurs within, and contributes to, a network of hierarchical relationships (see Swaine, 2017: 198-199); it is within this hierarchy that paternalism flourishes.

Paternalism is fed by the technical skills and expertise that underpins today's foreign assistance. From the crises of legitimacy in the 1990s arose the professionalization of foreign assistance in which standard operating procedures, spheres of competence, and bureaucratization sought to improve both the practice and reporting of foreign assistance (Barnett, 2016: 140-141). As a consequence, most foreign-assistance organizations prize thematic knowledge over country-specific knowledge. As Autesserre convincingly argues, "The idea of sending foreigners to a country they have never visited or studied so they can help people they know nothing about makes sense only to individuals and institutions who place the highest value of thematic competency and who deem local expertise unnecessary" (Autesserre, 2014: 72). Foreign-assistance workers do not exhibit paternalism by simply valuing thematic competencies. Paternalism is shown when they disregard the initiatives and intuitions of local actors, often conversing with recipient communities to ask for pre-planned project buy-in (Feldman, 2017) or failing to consult with them at all (Swaine, 2017). The allegation of paternalism does not necessarily deny foreign-assistance workers of honest intentions to help; good intentions and paternalism are intimately linked. Paternalism is the product of a desire to help, a judgment about the diminished capacity of who needs the help, and a belief in the superior capacity of the helper (Autesserre, 2014: 100; Barnett, 2017: 21). Indeed, foreign assistance entails an obligation to intervene and a sense of entitlement to do so (Heron, 2007); this obligation to intervene is born of good intentions.

Baker (2015) illuminates the role of paternalism in shaping American support for foreign assistance. He argues that white Americans exhibit a "paternalistic racism" whereby they attribute less agency to poor black foreigners than they do to poor white foreigners. Specifically, white Americans were more supportive of foreign aid when cued to consider foreign black recipients than they were when cued to consider foreign

white ones, and this occurs because white Americans conceptually deprive foreign black recipients of agency. The key insight from Baker is this perception of recipients' agency. White Americans' underestimation of poor black foreigners' agency suggests this: An assessment about the diminished agency of recipients inheres in foreign-assistance workers' decision to assist. This assessment presents an affront to recipients in that it conceives of them as helpless and awaiting assistance (Baaz, 2005; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011). While the outcome of this (giving) may be generous, the logic that motivates it (paternalism) may be insulting.

Paternalism manifests in foreign assistance across multiple issue areas.[6] The anti-human-trafficking movement, for instance, has exhibited paternalism by characterizing a variegated population of people — some have been moved unwillingly and others that have moved voluntarily — as trafficked victims. This characterization insists that people cannot consent to moving, even if they entered into the arrangement knowingly and willingly. The movement circumscribes "consent" by defining it in narrow terms, thereby liberally designating the status of trafficked victims (Merry & Ramachandran, 2017).

Portrayals of recipients make evident the paternalism of foreign assistance. The famine in Ethiopia of 1984-1985 was a watershed moment for development representation, forcing the humanitarian industry to reflect and revise its problematic portrayals of human suffering (Baaz, 2005: 122-123; Lidchi, 1999; Wilson, 2012: 55-57). Still, the discourse of foreign assistance tends to construct recipients as "passive agents awaiting the emancipatory intervention of development organizations" (Green, 2000: 68), and this construction appears in the photographic depictions of foreign-assistance recipients. A common representation — a nondescript child whose image is meant to depict the modal, quotidian suffering of her community — fails to represent the full humanity of the depicted (Malkki, 2015). The child is featured not for who she is as a person but what she represents: poor circumstances and impoverished communities. In other words, the child's image serves as a synecdoche for the entire "Third World," reducing one's humanity to her abject suffering, a suffering that is awaiting first-world assistance. These images not only reflect the existing dynamics of paternalism but also reproduce them (see Baaz, 2005: 121-123; Wilson, 2012: 55-67).

2.2.3 Visible Inequality

A third reason why recipients may dislike the assistance they receive stems from the material inequality that exists between foreign-assistance workers and recipients. Foreign assistance necessarily involves a relationship marked by material differences. The logic of assistance presupposes that some sort of need exists; otherwise, either one or both parties would be hard-pressed to arrange the assistance absent the need for it.

Anderson (2009) presents evidence as to why this, alone, is not a compelling reason why recipients would

[6]Paternalism has been documented in assistance to Palestinian refugees (Feldman, 2017), in post-conflict peace efforts (Autesserre, 2017), and in measures to combat sexual violence in Darfur (Swaine, 2017).

resent the assistance they receive. In writing on the Listening Project, which asks recipients about their perceptions of assistance, she explains, "[Recipients] understand and accept the impulse to help people in need as a natural impulse. Perhaps because today's aid recipients feel that, if they were in a position to help others who suffered from a calamity, they would do so, they do not interpret the act of giving as an indication of inequality" (Anderson, 2009: 99). Instead of something inherently incendiary about this material inequality, it is about the *visibility* of this inequality — that is, how foreign-assistance workers operate in recipient spaces — that engenders resentment. Many foreigners enjoy pleasant and more convenient accommodations (Autesserre, 2014: 207; Heron, 2007: 75-79; Jennings & Bøås, 2015; Mosse, 2005: 26), maintain "enclavic" and exclusively expatriate spaces (Duffield, 2010; Kohl, 2015; Kothari, 2006: 249; Smirl, 2015), and receive salaries that wildly preponderate what local people earn (Baaz, 2005: 84; Crewe & Harrison, 1998: 82-84; Fassin, 2012: 238-239; Fast, 2014: 144-145; McWha, 2011). They commonly navigate the physically taxing terrain of the places they are stationed using vehicles, which they receive from work or purchase on their own.[7] Experiencing mobility with relative ease, foreign-assistance workers can move quickly and comfortably, an option that is both evident and unavailable to most of the people they are sent to help.

Extending beyond how foreign-assistance workers traverse the places they are sent to serve, this mobility privilege has a second component: the exit options afforded to them when precarious circumstances crescendo to the point of imminent danger. In the latter case, foreign-assistance workers often have special evacuation options than locals do not (Des Forges, 1999: 605-618; Fassin, 2012: 239-240; Fast, 2014: 195; Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: chapter 14; 108; Suhrke, 1998). For instance, during the Rwandan genocide, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations told the UN force commander in no uncertain terms to remain impartial and stay strictly within his mandate, yet he could use his discretion to ensure the evacuation of foreign nationals (Barnett, 2002: 99-100). This instance of material inequality — an exit option in violent circumstances — has life-and-death implications. For these privileged people, the rules of impartiality do not apply, and yet we should least expect the field of foreign assistance to offer partial treatment. Humanitarian efforts are predicated on the idea that all lives have equal value, but partial treatment in times of crisis violates this; it ruptures, not fulfills, this equivalence of lives (Fassin, 2010). Foreign-assistance workers are committed in theory to this ideal — this equivalence of lives — but, when it counts most, abandon it by leaving the precarious place (Fassin, 2012: chapter 9). Abandoning the precarious place, despite the reluctance or regret the departed may feel about it, exhibits an "ontological inequality" (Fassin, 2012: 226). The point here is not to judge the cost-benefit analysis organizations conduct when deciding whether to keep

[7]Particularly striking in these contexts are sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) due to their occupation of space and their capacity to consume gasoline. Foreign-assistance workers' use of these imposing vehicles creates distance, both material (the barrier of the vehicles and the speed of their movement) and symbolic (unequal access to comforts and security), between the assisting and the assisted (Smirl, 2015: 101-106).

or pull their workers or to propose that foreign-assistance workers stay when the circumstances compromise their safety or efficacy. Instead, I want to identify this practice of partiality as a reason why people in recipient communities may dislike or distrust foreign assistance.

Malkki (2015) explores the motivations that drive foreign-assistance workers to engage in the work they do. She finds, "For them, there was a *need to help* [...] Taking that observation seriously meant revising some basic assumptions about who "the needy" are in the humanitarian encounter" (Malkki, 2015: 3, emphasis in original). This neediness can manifest in many forms. For some, the idea of the world outside, the elsewhere, the "over there" enchants and entices many of them, and this, in part, is why they engage in foreign assistance. Malkki also notes that the love and desire for travel propels many into this work. Professional concerns compel some to engage. Equipped with the desire to increase their prestige and credentials, many foreign-assistance workers exhibit, as Malkki describes, "a reluctant recognition that such a track record [of rare and difficult circumstances] could be pleasing" (Malkki, 2015: 40). There is also the element of self-escape; people can exit themselves by entering into a pursuit that is larger, global, and significant. In short, foreign-assistance workers possess a need — to assist, to explore, to excel, to escape — they cannot satiate without recipients' state of need (see also de Jong, 2011; Heron, 2007; Rahnema, 1997); the needs of the former to be "useful and generous, and as a link in a longer chain" of human efforts to help (Malkki, 2015: 151) critically depend on the presence of the latter.

Material inequality is made visible when foreign-assistance workers act as tourists in the places they are stationed. Examples of this include leisurely lounging on beaches (Autesserre, 2014: 204; Higate & Henry, 2009: 106-109), sightseeing and shopping, and heavy drinking (Henry, 2015). To understand how this could aggravate residents in places receiving foreign assistance, we need to situate it in the context of global inequality and the particular circumstances of the place that merit assistance. The point on global inequality matters when tourists hail from wealthy countries. In that case, tourism involves relatively rich tourists entering into places, expecting accommodation and entertainment. These host places must absorb the tourists, which encumbers the local environment by creating congestion or straining resources. The expectation that the places will accommodate, entertain, and absorb can only be sustained by a sense of entitlement on the part of the tourists, even if they intend no malice. Tourism often entails not just a flurry of activity but an assumed sense of superiority from the tourists based on the appeal of the place. To tourists from wealthy countries, the tourist spot is subordinate in terms of development but is superordinate in that it entails a way of life that is more "essential" and "authentic" (Baaz, 2005: 54-56, 158-163), stripped of the rationales and technologies that separate it from advanced places. The qualities that attract foreign assistance to the place — its anachronisms — are simultaneously what render it appealing for tourism. Relegating these places to pre-modern status degrades the logic that governs how and why these communities operate;

treating these places as something *before* implies that they are *beneath*. This can be understood as seeking, to borrow Turner and Ash's (1975) term, "pleasure from the periphery," through either the weather it affords or the wanderlust it fulfills (Gray, 1970). Key here is that the value of these places comes from their peripheral status, or their underdevelopment: The pleasure sought from the periphery derives from visitors' attempt to experience what they perceive as exotic or anachronistic (see also Mowforth and Munt, 1998). In short, asymmetries of power inhere in tourism.

That this is occurring in places requiring foreign assistance compounds the offense. To residents, the sight of foreigners " 'relaxing' (and earning) in their country despite the need to tackle insecurity" (Higate & Henry, 2009: 107) could suggest that the workers are approaching their time there as a holiday (even if the workers do not regard their time there as such). In other words, conspicuous pleasure being enjoyed by foreign-assistance workers in precarious spaces could be read as a disregard of the exigencies that brought them there in the first place.

This display of entitlement and consumption that accompany tourist behavior — backdropped by global inequality and local precariousness — may pique people who live there. This may hold even if the tourist behavior opens news avenues for employment and generates new forms of economic activity. The surge in economic activity from peacekeeping, for instance, often entrenches, rather than dislodges, the existing social inequalities by benefiting capital-rich foreign developers (Edu-Afful & Aning, 2015), increasing sexual transactions among the peacekeepers and the peacekept (Jennings, 2010), and pushing residents to the city periphery because housing in central spaces becomes prohibitively expensive (Jennings, 2018). Thus, the economic activity engendered by foreign assistance does not categorically or uniformly bring benefits. Put differently, the economic activity generated by foreign assistance may offset the offense of tourist behavior to the extant that it counteracts, rather than contributes to, the visible inequality that offends residents.

The friction arises, then, when the foreign-assistance workers — who are often handsomely compensated — forget or fail to realize that their needs are being met but, still, assume a moral high ground. In doing this, they often deny their local counterparts a metaphorical spot with them (Fassin, 2012: 238). As Autesserre (2014) describes in the context of post-conflict zones,[8]

> On the whole, interveners do not see their local employees or counterparts as making comparable sacrifices or being similarly motivated by a desire to do good. In my fifteen years of interacting with [interveners], I almost never heard expatriates refer to local employees in their organizations as people who wanted to help their fellow citizens or their home countries. Instead, interven-

[8] Autesserre's book relies on five kinds of data: field observations, participant observations, 295 formal interviews, hundreds of documents (policy reports, agency memos, internal guidelines), and practitioners' reports and academic writings. She spent extensive time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo conducting the research and made trips to Burundi, Cyprus, Israel and the Palestinian territories, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste.

> ers regularly portrayed their local colleagues as individuals whose motivations were primarily financial or professional. For local people in most conflict zones, intervening agencies provide the highest paid jobs, whereas the state usually cannot pay its employees much (if anything at all), and few individuals are able to make a decent salary in the private sector. This creates an observational equivalence problem: It is impossible for foreign peacebuilders to know whether local employees are working for international agencies for the sake of the cause or for the sake of the salary (and status) — or simply because it was the only job they could find. However, instead of recognizing this ambivalence, the dominant narrative reserves the moral high ground for expatriates and denies local staff members a claim to altruism. (Autesserre, 2014: 197)

Likewise, Baaz (2005) illuminates the hypocrisy when foreign-assistance workers want to curtail daily allowances for the local counterparts: "The argument the development workers sometimes put forward to the partners, that '*we* do not get allowances', is not without irony, given the total cost of an operation [devoted to sustaining development workers]" (Baaz, 2005: 134, emphasis in original). Indeed, employment in foreign assistance is a job, one that often requires sacrifice of comfort, family, and safety, but it also comes with perks (e.g., status and travel) and is a choice (Heron, 2007: 45-52). To suggest otherwise likely gives the impression that foreign-assistance workers do this work for self-congratulatory or disingenuous ends.

To improve this, Autesserre recommends that foreign-assistance workers "acknowledge the benefits that they receive from their work, such as financial compensation, travel opportunities, rewarding relationships, and career bonuses" (Autesserre, 2014: 268; see also de Jong, 2011). That recommendations about handling this visible inequality exist (see also Anderson & Olson, 2003: 28; Higate & Henry, 2009: 108) suggests that this visible material inequality provokes tensions. Baaz (2005) explores how foreign-assistance workers feel about this inequality, and she reveals that they hold complicated feelings about it, "a constant vacillation, with solidarity and altruism simultaneously disavowed and embraced" (Baaz, 2005: 90). By showing that many foreign-assistance workers hold this complicated view of their role and motivation — altruism and self-sacrifice, on the one hand, and guilt and isolation, on the other — we can see that this material inequality produces qualms for the foreign-assistance workers. Also, the visible inequality between foreign-assistance workers and recipients matters, in part, because it can lead to recipient resistance to assistance. Thinking in broad terms, this material inequality — made obvious and palpable to recipients (Autesserre, 2014: 194-214; Baaz, 2005: 3, 171; Higate & Henry, 2009: 82-83, 106-109; McMahon, 2017: 7-8) — is a reminder of the contradictions, if not hypocrisies, of foreign assistance. In short, the material inequality they enjoy is incompatible with the sanctimony some indulge, and this can strain the relationship between foreign-assistance workers and recipients, which then can lead the latter to look unfavorably at assistance.

Additionally, relative-deprivation theory offers insights about how the visible inequality that exists between foreign-assistance workers and recipients can generate negative attitudes. Relative-deprivation theory assumes that "people's reactions to objective circumstances depend on their subjective comparisons" (Walker & Smith, 2002: 1). For feelings of deprivation to emerge, a person must make a comparison, construct a cognitive appraisal of disadvantaged status, and experience a consequential sense of unfairness (Smith et al., 2012). The theory predicts that, even if someone lives in impoverished circumstances, feelings of deprivation will only arise once this person sees that others enjoy advantages — material or ideational — that are unavailable to her. We can apply this to foreign assistance. By observing the accommodations that foreign-assistance workers enjoy, recipients may realize the relative deprivation they experience, and this can breed resentment toward the entire assistance enterprise.

Chapter 3

Theory

I propose a theory of humanization that can occur when foreign-assistance recipients and employees interact. To summarize what follows, I consider how contact with foreign-assistance workers, who constitute an "outgroup," can improve recipients' attitudes toward them. Through the everyday (often seemingly unremarkable) encounters that constitute foreign-assistance work, recipients can see that foreign-assistance workers are as equally human as they, themselves, are — despite the potentially imposing, paternal, and visibly unequal arrangement — due to a subconscious process of humanization. Then, by considering the link between IOs and the individuals who work in them, I argue that these foreign-assistance workers come to represent the foreign-assistance organization from which they hail. This, in turn, can shape the way recipients perceive what they receive. As I discuss below, individuals embody their employers; they make concrete what was once abstract through their encounters with recipients. To buttress my argument, I rely on three lines of research: intergroup contact, infrahumanization, and IOs.

3.1 Intergroup Contact

First, research on intergroup relations has shown that an individual's attitudes toward outgroups — social-identity groups to which an individual does not belong — can improve with contact (e.g., Al Ramiah et al., 2014; Allport, 1954; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; Desforges et al., 1991; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Generally, scholars attribute this attitude-improvement effect to two mechanisms: anxiety reduction and empathy.

Regarding anxiety reduction, ingroup/outgroup dynamics are often characterized by a struggle for scarce material and/or symbolic resources. There is a fear of domination, especially for relatively powerless groups, and intergroup interactions can be fraught with fear of disapproval (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Making contact with an outgroup member, according to the anxiety-reduction mechanism, can mitigate this by

updating beliefs and reducing stereotypes about outgroups and endowing people with skills to navigate intergroup relations (Stephan, 2014: 249). Studies have given empirical credence to the anxiety-reducing mechanism (e.g., Blascovich et al., 2001; Paolini et al., 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Voci & Hewstone, 2003).

The second mechanism thought to drive the attitude-improvement effect is empathy, or the cognitive and affective capacity to see one's self in another person (Batson & Ahmad, 2009). Although humans are capable of experiencing empathy, our "empathic capacity is constrained by social factors" (Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Leagault, 2012: 361). Different activation patterns in the brain, when confronted with ingroup or outgroup members, evidence that an "empathy gap" exists (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). People can engage their empathic capacity to varying degrees, depending on the person toward whom they are to feel empathy. However, experimental evidence demonstrates that, when prompted to access their empathy, people report higher attitudes toward an outgroup than do those who were not prompted to feel empathy (e.g., Batson et al., 2002; Finlay & Stephan, 2000).

Empathy, when induced, can improve attitudes, but what induces it in intergroup contact? What about the encounter taps into ingroup members' empathy and improves attitudes toward the outgroup? It is important to note that much of the research on intergroup contact has been studied in intergroup dialogues and workshops that are designed to facilitate interaction and elicit perspective taking and storytelling (see Batson & Ahmad, 2009, for a review). Participants are asked to call upon their empathic capacity and focus on the superordinate goal of dialogue on difference. Additionally, individuals participate in these exchanges *because* hostility exists between them through their occupation of a different social group. Foreign-assistance recipients and workers, however, interact *despite* hostility that may exist between them. These two reasons — the nature and purpose of the interactions — mean that the aforementioned theoretical work gets us only part of the way.

How does this apply to the recipient/worker dynamic and the question of attitudes toward foreign assistance? The key insights to glean from the intergroup-contact research are 1) that attitudes can be endogenous to contact and 2) that sustained exposure to people who occupy a different group can facilitate positive attitudes. In my conception, foreign-assistance workers constitute one group, and residents of assistance-receiving countries make up the second group. I assume that enough visible difference exists between these two groups that it creates a salient social division. Although well-meaning, decent people largely constitute the foreign-assistance group and harbor the desire to enact positive change in the world (Anderson, 1998; Autesserre, 2014: 4-5; Dunn, 2017: 21; Fast, 2014: 43; McMahon, 2017: 4, 12; de Jong, 2011; Malkki, 2015), the structural realities that distinguish them from recipients are real, palpable, and divisive, as reviewed before. My theory assumes that this is enough for us to conceptualize two groups divided by a socially

salient cleavage.

3.2 Infrahumanization

I now detail how empathy — seeing another as equally human — can emerge when it is not explicitly summoned by the setting. Social psychologists have studied infrahumanization, the subconscious process by which ingroup members fail to attribute secondary emotions such as hope, love, remorse, and contempt to outgroup members and, instead associate with them only primary emotions like rage, lust, fear, and surprise (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001; Paladino et al., 2002).[1] There is a "differential association of uniquely human characteristics" (Paladino et al., 2002: 114) because, by linking secondary emotions solely to their own members, ingroups deny outgroup members the things we regard as exclusively human. Primary emotions correspond to the visceral and primal; these emotions exhibit "quick onset, brief duration, and unbidden occurrence" (Leyens et al., 2000: 189). Secondary emotions, in contrast, exist exclusively in the human realm; they are how we distinguish the human species from other animals.

Both high- and low-status group members attribute fewer secondary emotions to outgroups than they do to ingroups (Leyens et al., 2001). High-status groups like foreign-assistance workers and low-status groups like recipients, then, both engage in infrahumanization. But how does this dual infrahumanization link to the emergence of empathy in settings that do not explicitly summon it? Its inverse, humanization, subconsciously bestows secondary emotions to outgroups, and it offers the possibility that empathy can emerge from quotidian interactions, not just concerted exchanges like intergroup dialogue. Seeing an outgroup member exhibit kindness toward an ingroup member over an issue unrelated to the salient intergroup tension can foster humanization (Gubler et al. 2015). Experimental research in psychology has shown that mimicking the actions of an outgroup member reduces biases toward the outgroup (Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault, 2012).

This does not mean that intergroup contact or humanization erases identity categories. In fact, one model of intergroup contact proposes that the maintenance, not the elimination, of identity categories is essential because it allows for generalization beyond contact with a single outgroup member (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Otherwise, the positive exchange would not facilitate favorable attitudes toward the outgroup because the individual would not belong to the outgroup if she is regarded as an exceptional member of the outgroup.

[1] This is not dehumanization, which denies an outgroup of any humanness (Leyens et al., 2007). Differentiating between dehumanization and infrahumanization accounts for the possibility that, relative to the former, "something of much lesser magnitude could occur in everyday life" (Leyens et al., 2007: 143).

3.3 International Organizations and the People Who Embody Them

Much of foreign assistance occurs through IOs such as the UN and the World Bank. In order for attitudes toward foreign assistance to improve through the aforementioned humanization process, there must be a link between the IOs through which foreign assistance occurs and the people who work in them. Scholars have sought to ascertain what this link looks like in practice. Notably, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that IOs are not mere instruments of the states that found them but are, instead, frequent, active, and often independent participants in international politics. This conceptualization of IOs pushes us to look *beyond* state interests and investigate *within* the things these states create.

One way to investigate *within* the things these states create is to focus on the individuals who populate IOs. The literature demonstrates ways how these individuals shape IO operations. For instance, Chwieroth (2015) posits that the professional training — and the normative orientation underpinning it — of IMF staff influences the organization's approach to enforcing conditions. Similarly, many have documented how the ways that foreign-assistance bureaucrats see the sources of recipient-country problems shape what kinds of assistance they prescribe (e.g., Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Crewe & Harrison, 1998), and scholars have long been interested in the types of people recruited to work at IOs and the staffing processes behind them (see Novosad & Werker, 2018 and Parízek, 2017 for recent inquiries). Implicit in these analyses is the idea that the types of people who work for an IO influences how the IO operates.

I add to this by centering on not who they are in terms of nationality, educational background, or normative approach to foreign assistance. Instead, I focus on how they come to embody the IOs for which they work and how, in this embodied role, they (inter)act with recipients. Because IOs are often large, multifaceted institutions with numerous actors and interests embedded within them (Tallberg et al., 2014), it is not obvious just how recipients form impressions of them. It is possible that the impression one forms about them comes from the media or politicians' rhetoric, which is often negative (e.g., Fast, 2014: 133; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012: 53). One's impression of these IOs can also stem from encounters they have with actual actors who work for them. In this, the employees are not only the arms of the IO (implementing its work) but also its face, animating what had been an abstract, distant organization.

How is foreign assistance experienced and understood by recipients? Projects are an obvious way; after all, they *are* the foreign assistance, the "primary unit of planning interventions and of helping people" (Krause, 2014: 25), or at least they way foreign assistance reaches recipients. Often projects are permanently incomplete (Williams, 2017); in the process of being created; or, once completed, unable to signal to recipients the organization that produced them (Dietrich, Mahmud, & Winters, 2018). The process of project creation — the unfolding of events as the project is organized and implemented on the ground — holds opportunity

for recipients to experience and generate understandings of the foreign assistance. Scholars, in studying the securitization of foreign-assistance spaces, have questioned its effects and illuminated ways that people apprehend space (Duffield, 2010; Fast, 2014; Smirl, 2015). Specifically, the structures of foreign assistance (compounds, enclavic spaces, conspicuously pleasant accommodation, SUVs) do more than just shelter and transport foreign-assistance workers. Foreign assistance is practiced through these structures and, through them, takes on a physical form related to, but separate from, material project outputs. Alternatively put, they are part of, and partake in, the formation of impressions that recipients hold.

Foreign-assistance workers do this, too, creating the live form. Foreign assistance is a relational act, comprising "social beings embedded in a complex web of relationships" (Fast, 2014: 145). By considering the relational nature of foreign assistance, actors on the ground become central, as do the interactions they experience with each other. Interaction can take on many forms in foreign assistance because the nature of the work necessitates a great deal of movement, people-power, and planning, in addition to the quotidian operational details that allow it to function. This quality of foreign assistance — its need for people-powered maintenance — makes it replete with interaction: There are items delivered, buy-in secured, meetings orchestrated, terms negotiated, programs managed, projects evaluated, feedback solicited, stakeholders consulted, and needs assessed. People, both foreign-assistance workers and recipients, are present in these activities, making possible the many actions and exchanges that constitute foreign assistance.

Some scholars have foregrounded interactions between recipients and foreign-assistance workers, exploring economic exchanges and their constitutive effects (Jennings, 2015; Jennings & Bøås, 2015) or information-sharing interactions and their causal effects (Gordon & Young, 2017). Both point to the possibility that foreign-assistance workers are agents in shaping attitudes toward because, in the constellation of foreign assistance with its projects and structures, the people enact and embody their employers. Foreign-assistance workers are central parts of this constellation. Organizations stress in their codes of conduct that their employees represent the organization for which they work at all times, not only during official hours of operation (Fast, 2014: 146-148). The idea that employees embody the organization animates the expectation that employees will behave in a way that befits the organization's projected image.

3.4 Theory, in Summary

I conceptualize interactions in foreign assistance as occurring between two groups (foreign-assistance workers and recipients). There is an empathic capacity possessed by these group members, which favors ingroup members over outgroup ones but which can also subconsciously grow to regard outgroup members as equally human through secondary-emotion attribution. Finally, there is the IO embodied by individual employees.

Contact resulting from the routine and seemingly unremarkable aspects of foreign assistance provides the opportunity for recipients to apprehend the humanity of foreign-assistance workers — despite the imposing, paternal, and visibly unequal relationship existing between them. Finally, this extends to the IOs from which the foreign-assistance workers hail because they serve as the face of the IO and embody it.

The aforementioned theory hypothesizes that those who have contact with foreign-assistance workers will hold more favorable views of foreign assistance than will those who do not have contact. Specifically in the context of this research project, those who indicate that they work with the World Bank are more likely to rate the institution favorably.

In studying individual attitudes toward the IMF and World Bank, Breen and Gillanders (2015) include membership in a community-development association (CDA) in their models to proxy for civil-society involvement. They find a positive association between CDA membership and ratings of the World Bank. On this finding, they speculate that members of organizations devoted to community development will exhibit greater trust due to the relevance of the World Bank's mission. Yet, the works reviewed before open the possibility for the opposite to occur: Precisely *because* these people care about and are involved in development will they distrust the World Bank. Since this variable is a control, not a key explanatory variable, their paper does not intend to explain why the link between CDA membership and rating obtains. It requires more systematic empirical investigation. I turn to this later.

Chapter 4

Research Design

In this section, I describe the two analyses that constitute my research design. The first employees data from the World Bank Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, described below, and the second relies on data from the Afrobarometer survey series.

4.1 World Bank's Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program

4.1.1 Data

To evaluate my theory, I use five years of data from the World Bank's COS Program (World Bank Group, 2012-2016). This solicits feedback from individuals working in some capacity within a client country — national or local governments, bilateral or multilateral aid agencies, faith-based groups, the media, academia, among others — through survey questions in order to gain insights into how the client-country recipients regard the World Bank. Part of the Public Opinion Research Group of the World Bank, the COS Program began in 2012 and staggers its client countries, surveying them every three years.

Each questionnaire must incorporate specific questions to be aggregated into the World Bank Group's annual Corporate Scorecard. The World Bank Group's Corporate Scorecard, produced each year, documents the organization's performance, and the feedback solicited by the COS Program features in, but is not the sole source of information for, the Corporate Scorecard. The World Bank revises the survey instrument for relevance in each country (Felzer, 2012), and an external public-opinion group designs and reports the surveys (World Bank Group, 2014). Making no contact with potential participants, the World Bank hires an independent firm to invite them (purposively and non-randomly) and to collect the data. For each respondent, survey administration occurred one of three ways: Respondents received and returned the questionnaire either by 1) courier or 2) email, or 3) a field consultant conducted face-to-face survey administration. Surveys are translated and back-translated to ensure accuracy. Tables 4 to 8 in the appendix

list each country surveyed, the number of people invited to participate, the number of people who partook, and the response rates for each year of the survey.

The sampling procedure that the World Bank uses to gather responses does not guarantee a representative sample of the population of interest. Thus, my analysis suffers from nonresponse bias to the extent that nonrespondents systematically differ from respondents. It is plausible that nonrespondents feel less strongly about the World Bank than do respondents since the latter group agreed to participate in the COS survey. In this conception, respondents have strength of feeling, representing the extremes of opinions (i.e., those who highly favor the World Bank and those who strongly dislike it). For my purposes, we need that these extremes are represented equally across those who have contact with the World Bank and those who have not. Put differently, whatever the skew (a sample of supporters, a sample of opponents, or a sample that contains both extremes), it must be equal across those who have and who have not had contact with the World Bank in order to calm concerns about nonresponse.

My project hinges on the difference in attitudes between those who have had contact with the World Bank and those who had not, so it matters if the internal dynamics within potential participants that lead them to partake or not differ between these two groups. Under the null hypothesis, attitudes toward the World Bank do not vary according to contact. I could be led to commit a type-I error (rejecting the null when the null is true) if motivations for participation differ according to contact in a specific way: Among potential participants who have had contact, only the ones who rate the World Bank favorably participate, while a different pattern of participation arises from those who have not had contact. In this scenario, I would be rejecting the null not because it is false (i.e., contact begets favorable assessments) but because I examined only the responses of those who have had contact *and* assess the World Bank favorably. Theoretically, I have no reason to believe that this scenario, which says that among those who have had contact, only those who assess the World Bank favorably chose to participate. People tend to expend energy to report feedback from a negative encounter but are less likely to provide feedback for a positive one. There is no clear intuition about the motivations and dynamics of participation — specifically, how the decision to participate in the survey differs between those who have had contact with the World Bank and those who had not.

4.1.2 Outcome Variable

To construct my outcome variable, I use responses to the question, "Overall, please rate your impression of the World Bank Group's effectiveness in [respondent's country]." Responses range from 1 (not effective at all) to 10 (extremely effective); alternatively, respondents could select "don't know." In 2013, there were 297 "don't knows"; in 2014, 437; and in 2016, 265. For 2012 and 2015, the "don't know" option appears in the

questionnaire but does not emerge in the data, which suggests that the COS Program coded "don't knows" as missing before publishing the data. I treat the "don't knows" that appear in the data (i.e., in 2013, 2014, and 2016) as missing. There is no natural position in the measure for the "don't knows" to occupy or no appropriate value within the 1-to-10 measure that subsumes that particular response. Although middle-number scores (e.g., 4, 5, 6) seem like possible candidates, this choice would conflate a non-assessment of "don't know" with an actual assessment that suggests "average" or "fair". This would conceal the subtle but important difference that can exist between answers of "don't know" and a middle score; the former does not commit to assessing, while the latter offers an assessment (that happens to be a non-extreme value).

My measure imperfectly captures the concept it seeks to contain; an assessment of the World Bank's effectiveness may contribute to, but does not fully encapsulate, an individual's overall feelings toward the World Bank. In adopting this question as my outcome variable, I assume that effectiveness ratings correlate with overall attitudes toward the World Bank, enough for the former to proxy for the latter. A second limitation of this measure is that it (most likely, unknowingly) denies respondents the option to express a neutral or middle option. Spanning 1 through 10, the scale contains an even number of options, although this is not obvious because people assume that the score of 5 indicates the middle (Fowler, 1995: 53-55).

This is not ideal in terms of questionnaire design, but it poses a problem for my analysis to the extent that awareness of the lack varies according to my explanatory variable, contact with the World Bank. Specifically, it is a problem if respondents with contact realized that the absence of a neutral option and adjusted responses accordingly while the other group did not. In that case, respondents with contact may report relatively higher assessments of the World Bank. My theory would attribute their responses, artificially inflated due to poor survey design, to contact with the World Bank. Theoretically, I have no reason to think that the intuition about 5 indicating neutrality differs according to contact status. Alternatively put, I assume that awareness about the lack of a neutral option is not systematic but random, if respondents realize this flaw in the question at all.

FIGURE 1: Ratings of the World Bank's Effectiveness among COS Program Respondents, 2012-2016



4.1.3 Explanatory and Control Variables

I operationalize my explanatory variable, contact with the World Bank, using the questions asked to respondents about their collaboration. Table 1 takes inventory of relevant characteristics of the survey for each year. In it, I list the exact wording of the collaboration question and the possible choices with which participants could respond for each year.

TABLE 1: Inventory of Relevant Characteristics in the COS Program, 2012-2016

Year	Countries	Collaborate Question	Collaborate Responses	Positions	Gender
2012	29	Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank in your country?	1) yes, 2) no	21	no
2013	41	Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank in your country?	1) yes, 2) no	21	no
2014	35	Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank Group in your country?∗	1) yes, 2) no	21	no
2015	32	Which one of the following best describes your level of interaction with the World Bank Group (*arms active in country*) in your country? †	1) I currently collaborate with the World Bank Group, 2) I have previously collaborated with the World Bank Group, 3) Both of the above (I currently collaborate and previously have collaborated with the World Bank Group), 4) I have never collaborated with the World Bank Group	19	yes
2016	39	Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank Group (*arms active in country*) in your country?	1) yes, 2) no	19	yes

∗ Nine of the 35 surveys in 2014 include parentheses with the arms of the IO active in the country after "World Bank Group."

† Surveys for Mauritania and Sudan do not include the arms of the World Bank active in the country within parentheses.

As displayed in Table 1, all surveys except the 2015 one ask respondents about collaboration with the World Bank in a dichotomous way. The 2015 survey, in contrast, affords respondents four possible choices, not two. I address this discrepancy by treating those in the 2015 survey who indicated either current, previous, or both current and previous collaboration as affirming collaboration (i.e., they receive the value of one on the dichotomous collaboration variable). Not only does the number of responses for the collaboration question vary in these surveys; the wording of the question and the description of the World Bank's constitute parts vary (if present at all). Specifically, in 2012 and 2013, the survey refers to the IO as the "World Bank" and does not include names of specific arms in parentheses. The three proceeding surveys refer to the IO as the "World Bank Group" and sometimes list constituent arms in parentheses (although the 2016 surveys consistently provide this information in parentheses). What does this mean for my analysis?

It is not clear what the "World Bank"/"World Bank Group" distinction represents, but a careful examination of the surveys' attendant documents illuminates the possible thinking behind it. In the 2012 and 2013 questionnaires, the IO is always called the World Bank, never the World Bank Group; in the next three years, the reverse is true. Never does the 2012 or 2013 survey ask respondents to assess the World Bank Group, and never does the 2014, 2015, or 2016 survey ask respondents to assess the World Bank. This suggests that the wording change from "World Bank" to "World Bank Group" signifies a shift only in language, not content. The questionnaires still task respondents with evaluating the IO, whether it uses the term "World Bank" or "World Bank Group."[1] Whatever the logic behind the wording shift, my theory makes no distinction between arms of the World Bank. The work of each arm within the IO differs considerably from that of the other arms, and the amount of contact made could differ across arms because of the nature of their work. My theory, however, does not articulate why the work an arm does drives how its employees behave when interaction occurs.

Before I introduce the control variables, I explore how one feature of the outcome variable — the aforementioned "don't know" response — relates to my explanatory variable of collaboration with the World Bank. Figure 2 graphs the number of respondents that do or do not collaborate with the World Bank by whether respondents gave a numerical value or selected "don't know" in response to the question about rating the World Bank's effectiveness for 2013, 2014, and 2016. (Recall that, for 2012 and 2015, the COS Program seems to have coded "don't knows" as missing prior to publishing those data.) If interaction matters for forming assessments, we should expect that the proportion of respondents who have collaborated with the World Bank among those who gave a numerical rating exceeds the proportion of respondents who have collaborated with the World Bank among those who said "don't know" on the assessment question. As Figure 2 confirms, while collaborators form the minority in both those who provided a rating and those who answered "don't know," the minority of the former (0.44) is twice the size of the minority of the latter (0.22).

[1]The former term can colloquially substitute for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), or it can encompass all five arms of the IO.

FIGURE 2: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Numerical Responses Versus "Don't Know" in the 2013, 2014, and 2016 COS Program



I include an employment-position variable to account for the possibility that the nature of one's work affects both how exposed someone is to the World Bank and how she views it. Someone's work may determine how much contact she has with the World Bank *and* how well she views the World Bank; employment position, then, may confound the relationship between contact and attitude. To capture this, I use responses to the following question: "Which of the following best describes your current position?" The norm in the 2012, 2013, and 2014 survey was to include 21 categories. For 2015 and 2016, the norm was 19 categories.[2] In order to avoid deluging my model with variables, I meaningfully combine these positions into nine groups:

- Government: Office of the President, Prime Minister; Office of Minister; Office of Parliamentarian; Employee of a Ministry, Ministerial Department, or Implementation Agency; Local government office or staff; Independent government institution; Judiciary branch,
- Watchdog: NGO/community-based organization, media (press, radio, TV, web, etc.),
- Faith, trade, and youth: trade union; faith-based group; youth group,
- PMUs: Project Management Unit (PMU) overseeing implementation of project/ consultant/ contractor working on World Bank Group supported project/program,
- Research: Academia/research institute/think tank,
- Bi/multilateral: Bilateral/multilateral agency,

[2]Examples of deviation from this norm include the 16 roles listed in the 2015 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates surveys and the 12 roles listed in the 2016 Turkmenistan survey.

- Private: Private-sector organization; Private foundation; Financial sector/private bank,
- State-owned enterprise, [3]
- Other.

Some of the survey's positions cohere into intuitive categories of employment. Consider the first of the nine categories listed (government), which involves individuals working in the offices of a prime minister, president, parliamentarian, ministry, local government, or the judiciary. Although distinct in important ways, these positions are employees of government officials or the government and, as such, may share similar career trajectories, salary expectations, and interest in prestige or service. Yet three of the nine categories I created — watchdogs; faith, trade, and youth; and private — require justification as to why I formed them as substantively similar employment. First, two positions that respondents could select (NGO/community-based organizations and the media) constitute the watchdog group because they may task themselves with speaking truth to power and holding IOs to account; they may regard IOs with suspicion or caution and are critical of what they produce. Next, I combine faith, trade, and youth groups into one category because each tends to attract members voluntarily through a shared interest, preoccupation, or practice (as people of the same faith, as people with a shared skill, or as people of the same generation). Third, the private category hosts the positions of private-sector organizations, private foundations, and the financial sector/private bank; common among these groups are the deep, private pockets and relative abundance of resources that make possible their work.

Finally, I include a dichotomous measure of gender as a control for the years that the COS Program ask respondents for their gender (2015 and 2016). I constructed this variable such that men receive the value of zero and women the value of one. Gender may drive who gets to collaborate with the World Bank while also affecting attitudes toward the international organization (Edwards, 2009); failure to include it may omit a confounding variable. Figure 3 depicts that, while the number of men preponderates the number of women in my sample, collaboration does not vary according to gender. The proportion of both men and women that report collaboration is 0.50.

[3]Only the China 2015 survey had state-owned enterprises as an option.

FIGURE 3: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies Does Not Vary by Gender in the 2015 and 2016 COS Program (the proportion of men, 0.50; of women, 0.50)



Next, as shown in Figure 4, collaboration is more common than not among three groups: government workers (collaboration proportion = 0.54, n = 7,010), PMUs (collaboration proportion = 0.79, n = 2,021), and bi-/multilateral work (collaboration proportion = 0.66, n = 1,212). Among watchdogs, the collaboration proportion is 0.33 (n = 2,480). Among faith/trade/youth groups, the collaboration proportion is 0.28 (n = 254). Among researchers, the collaboration proportion is 0.32 (n = 975). Among the sampled in private work, the collaboration proportion is 0.38 (n = 1,807). Among those in state-owned enterprises, the collaboration proportion is 0.45 (n = 83). Among those who indicated their position as other, the collaboration proportion is 0.37 (n = 712).

FIGURE 4: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Employment Position in the COS Program, 2012-2016



4.2 Afrobarometer

4.2.1 Data

The Afrobarometer survey series asks questions to residents of countries in Africa in order to gauge attitudes toward economic, political, and social issues. The survey series began in 1999 and continues today but, because the Afrobarometer included a question on the World Bank only in its second round, the data I examine come from 2002 and 2003 and include 15 countries (Africa et al., 2002-2004).[4] The Afrobarometer generates samples so that every citizen of voting age in a given country has an equal chance of being selected using clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sampling (Afrobarometer, 2018). Table 9 in the appendix lists each country surveyed, the number of people invited to participate, the number of people who participated, and the response rates.

[4]The Afrobarometer Round II included 16 countries, but I excluded Zimbabwe from my sample because its participants were not asked the questions used to construct my outcome and explanatory variables.

4.2.2 Outcome Variable

To assess attitudes toward the World Bank, I use responses to the following question: "Giving marks out of ten, where 0 is very badly and 10 is very well, how well do you think the following institutions do their jobs? Or haven't you heard enough about the institution to have an opinion? World Bank." Unlike the COS question used to construct the outcome variable for the first analysis, this Afrobarometer question has an 11-point response.

FIGURE 5: Ratings of the World Bank's Effectiveness among Afrobarometer Participants, 2002-2003



4.2.3 Explanatory and Control Variables

Respondents were asked, "Could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member [of] a community development or self-help association?" To construct the explanatory variable, I coded a three-level ordinal variable: those who indicated no membership or inactive membership, those who selected active membership, and those who chose official leadership. I treat those who chose "don't know/haven't heard enough" as missing.

If interaction matters for forming assessments, we should expect that the proportion of respondents

with active CDA membership or official leadership among those who gave a numerical rating exceeds the proportion of respondents with active CDA membership or official leadership among those who said "don't know" on the assessment question. As Figure 6 illustrates, non-members or inactive members formed the vast majority of both groups: 0.77 of those who gave a numerical rating and 0.85 of those who did not know. Alternatively put, almost one fourth of the respondents who gave a numerical rating of the World Bank were active members or official leaders of CDAs (compared to the proportion of respondents that were active members or official leaders among those who did not know how to assess the World Bank, which was 0.15).

FIGURE 6: CDA Membership Varies by Numerical Responses Versus "Don't Know" in the Afrobarometer, 2002-2003

My choice to use involvement in CDAs and to categorize this involvement as a three-level ordinal variable requires an explanation. In treating this variable as my explanatory variable, I assume that the World Bank engages with CDAs and that contact varies according to CDA membership status; official leaders will have the most contact with the World Bank, then will active members, followed by those who are not members or are inactive members.

The World Bank's outreach to and involvement of local organizations has increased, not just for project implementation but also the planning that precedes it (O'Brien et al., 2000; chapter 2). Including these local organizations leverages organic participation and bypasses the challenges of inducing participation (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). The World Bank has applied a "community-driven development" approach to some of its

projects, harnessing the existing infrastructure of groups present in countries (International Development Association, 2016). In fact, the IO has a unit called the Community Driven Development Global Solutions Group dedicated to this approach.

This is not to suggest that the access afforded to outside actors by IOs substantially shifts the power dynamics or prevailing ways of thinking within these organizations. Critics have problematized these measures, rather than assumed their ability to engender change. While some posit that civil-society invitation has the potential for meaningful inclusion (e.g., Scholte, 2002), others have alleged it to be cosmetic and insubstantial (e.g., Kim, 2011). The prevailing ways of thinking and doing have calcified over decades within IOs, making IOs nearly impenetrable to change (Weaver, 2008); many have voiced suspicion over how well inviting external actors into the process can actually engender change. For the sake of my project, however, the issues or agendas that concern these external actors need not actually penetrate World Bank thinking or practice; it is that the World Bank has involved these local stakeholders in project processes, and this involvement begets interaction. Tallberg et al. (2014) examine the evolution of IO opening to transnational actors (TNAs). For each IO in their stratified random sample of IOs, the authors construct a measure of access that TNAs enjoy according to the range, depth, permanence, and codification of access each of the n bodies within the IO affords (Tallberg et al., 2014: 746).[5] Using the Tallberg et al. measure, Figure 7 displays two features of World Bank access: 1) The IO has increased its access since 1981, and 2) this increase in access exceeds the mean access afforded by other IOs.

As mentioned previously, Breen and Gillanders (2015) found a positive association between CDA membership and ratings of the World Bank in the Afrobarometer data. They created a dichotomous measure of CDA membership, grouping together active members with official leaders and non-members with inactive members. While their dichotomous measure of CDA membership suits their purpose of controlling for civil-society participation, it is does not suit my analysis since contact with the World Bank varies *within* CDAs. IOs, in seeking to open up to civil society, often look to CDAs as natural apertures. In this way, CDAs are conduits for contact, but the leaders of these groups manage access to them because meeting with many individuals overwhelms the realistic capacity of an IO to conduct civil-society outreach.[6] Indeed, this feature is one of the complaints lodged against the World Bank: that it only scratches the surface of civil-society engagement (Mercer, 2003). Returning to my analysis, official leaders of CDAs differ from active members in terms of contact with the World Bank, and my coding of the explanatory variable treats them as such.

[5]Specifically, the formula is $\frac{1}{n}\sum_1^n$(range + depth) x permanence x codification.

[6]Barnett (2016) makes a similar point that post-crisis response teams cannot canvas a large number of a population affected by a crisis due to resource constraints (Barnett, 2016: 141-142).

FIGURE 7: Access to International Organizations for Transnational Actors Over Time According to Tallberg et al. (2014) Data



Returning to the Afrobarometer data, Figure 8 sorts countries from the lowest proportion to the highest proportion of non- or inactive members in the sample; on the left, 0.63 of the sampled Kenyans identified as non- or inactive members, and on the right, 0.95 of the sampled Namibians did.

FIGURE 8: CDA Membership across 15 Countries of the Afrobarometer, 2002-2003



4.3 Analysis

First, for each year of the COS Program, I apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to see the association between the dichotomous measure of collaboration and a respondent's 10-point rating of the World Bank. I include employment position, gender (in years it is available, or 2015 and 2016), and the country in which one resides.[7] In addition to year-specific models, I run one model on all data from 2012 to 2016, including country-year dummy variables to account for unobserved idiosyncrasies of time and place. For the Afrobarometer data, I run OLS, regressing a respondent's 11-point rating of the World Bank on level of CDA membership. I control for gender, place (urban or rural), and a resident's country.

[7] I include country-dummy variables with the exception of four countries in 2015 (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). The COS Program grouped them together as the Middle East, precluding disaggregation by country for these four. Thus, in my models, Bahran, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates do not have their own country-dummy variables and, instead, share one as the Middle East.

Chapter 5

Results

Table 2 documents the results from running the analyses on the World Bank COS data. Results from each year-specific model appear in chronological order, followed by results from the 2012-2016 model. The coefficient attached to the collaboration variable ranges from 0.61 (95% CI: 0.49, 0.74; $p = 0.000$) to 0.77 (95% CI: 0.66, 0.88; $p = 0.000$). The magnitude of the collaboration-variable coefficient exceeds that of all other coefficients in the models. Recall that the outcome variable is the 10-point rating of the World Bank's effectiveness; we must interpret the coefficients, tabled on the next page, with this in mind. In words, collaborating with the World Bank is associated with a higher assessment — over half to three-fourths of a numerical rating — of World Bank effectiveness, holding fixed employment position (and gender in 2015 and 2016).

Next, Table 3 shows the results from the Afrobarometer analysis. Recall that I constructed my explanatory variable for this analysis as a three-level ordinal measure from four possible responses. I grouped together those who indicated no or inactive membership to form the reference group, and I left distinct those who selected active membership and those who chose official-leader status. Accordingly, as non-members or inactive members as the reference, active members of CDAs reported higher ratings of the World Bank, on average ($\hat{\beta} = 0.14$; 95% CI: 0.02, 0.26; $p = 0.02$), as did official leaders ($\hat{\beta} = 0.39$; 95% CI: 0.15, 0.64; $p = 0.002$). Again, we must keep in mind that the outcome variable here is the 11-point rating of the World Bank's effectiveness. These CDA-membership coefficients are small in magnitude; when viewed in addition to the COS results, however, they lend support to my theory.

TABLE 2: Attitudes toward the World Bank Vary by Collaboration, COS Program, 2012-2016

	2012			2013			2014		
Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***
collaborates	0.61***	0.49, 0.74	0.000	0.70***	0.61, 0.80	0.000	0.77***	0.66, 0.88	0.000
position									
government									
NGO/media	-0.20**	-0.36, -0.04	0.01	-0.45***	-0.58, -0.33	0.000	-0.27***	-0.41, -0.13	0.000
faith/trade/youth orgs	0.17	-0.24, 0.58	0.42	0.37**	-0.67, -0.08	0.01	-0.50**	-0.87, -0.12	0.01
PMU	0.39***	0.18, 0.61	0.000	-0.04	-0.23, 0.15	0.70	0.32**	0.12, 0.52	0.002
researchers	-0.24*	-0.45, -0.03	0.02	-0.43***	-0.61, -0.25	0.000	-0.53***	-0.71, -0.34	0.000
bi-/multi-laterals	-0.17	-0.45, 0.11	0.23	-0.23*	-0.44, -0.02	0.04	-0.20	-0.44, 0.03	0.09
private groups	-0.24**	-0.42, -0.05	0.01	-0.45***	-0.60, -0.31	0.000	-0.34***	-0.49, -0.19	0.000
state-owned enterprise	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.17	-0.54, 0.19	0.35
other	-0.10	-0.31, 0.12	0.38	-0.19	-0.41, 0.04	0.10	-0.29*	-0.53, -0.04	0.02
woman	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.1265			0.1264			0.1340		
n	5,066			7,427			7,252		

	2015			2016			2012-2016		
Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***
collaborates	0.67***	0.54, 0.80	0.000	0.70***	0.59, 0.80	0.000	0.70***	0.65, 0.75	0.000
position									
government									
NGO/media	-0.26**	-0.42, -0.09	0.002	-0.42***	-0.56, -0.28	0.000	-0.33***	-0.40, -0.27	0.000
faith/trade/youth orgs	-0.39*	-0.70, -0.07	0.02	-0.57***	-0.89, 0.26	0.000	-0.36***	-0.51, -0.21	0.000
PMU	0.48***	0.26, 0.70	0.000	0.28**	0.08, 0.48	0.01	0.27***	0.18, 0.36	0.000
researchers	-0.55***	-0.79, -0.31	0.000	-0.65***	-0.83, -0.46	0.000	-0.48***	-0.57, -0.40	0.000
bi-/multi-laterals	-0.19	-0.47, 0.09	0.18	-0.32**	-0.54, -0.11	0.003	-0.22***	-0.33, -0.11	0.000
private groups	-0.28**	-0.46, -0.09	0.003	-0.49***	-0.65, -0.34	0.000	-0.37***	-0.44, -0.30	0.000
state-owned enterprise	-0.45	-1.91, 1.01	0.54	-	-	-	-0.20	-0.54, 0.13	0.24
other	-0.02	-0.30, 0.26	0.87	-0.25*	-0.51, -0.001	0.05	-0.19***	-0.29, -0.08	0.001
woman	0.17**	0.03, 0.30	0.01	0.14**	0.03, 0.24	0.01	-	-	-
R^2	0.1272			0.1108			0.1276		
n	5,051			6,687			31,872		

*$p \leq 0.05$, **$p \leq 0.01$, ***$p \leq 0.001$

For year-specific models, country dummy variables are included but not reported. For the 2012-2016 model, country-year dummy variables are included but not reported.

TABLE 3: Attitudes toward the World Bank Vary by Level of Membership in CDAs, Afrobarometer, 2002-2003

Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	**95% CI**	***p***
CDA membership			
not member or inactive member			
active member	0.14*	0.02, 0.26	0.02
official leader	0.39**	0.15, 0.64	0.002
woman	0.05	-0.04, 0.14	0.32
rural	0.07	-0.02, 0.17	0.13
R^2	0.0602		
n	12,196		

*$p \leq 0.05$, **$p \leq 0.01$, ***$p \leq 0.001$

Country dummy variables are included but not reported.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This paper explores the possibility that a process of humanization occurs when foreign-assistance workers and recipients interact. This happens, according to my theory, because interaction serves as opportunity for the foreign-assistance worker 1) to embody her employer and 2) to exhibit her humanity. Using 2012-2016 data from the World Bank Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program and the 2002-2003 Afrobarometer to examine this, I find preliminary support. This support must be interpreted with an eye to this paper's limitations.

The instrument that the COS Program uses — a pre-determined, close-ended survey — precludes certain answers from arising. In that it does not allow for open-ended responses, it does not encourage participants to share what is most important to them (Anderson, Brown, & Jean, 2012: 10-11). Furthermore, by offering a pre-defined list of options, the instrument implicitly signals what is considered a valid response and constrains what the respondent reports (Cornwall & Fujita, 2012). While the pre-determined list of options establishes consistency across surveys, this comes at a cost, and the "othering" of alternative views may forfeit organic feedback. In other words, the options you give respondents shape the story you tell, and this matters for how we understand the relationship between actors in foreign assistance.

Yet a strength of the COS Program data should be stressed. The population from which they sample — people in recipient countries that work, to varying degrees and in different ways, with the World Bank or in a related field — has important insights and experiences from which scholars of foreign assistance can learn. These people exist in recipient societies and observe what foreign assistance looks like in practice. In that the literature on attitudes toward IOs overwhelmingly uses data from the general publics across the world (e.g., Breen & Gillanders, 2015; Edwards, 2009; Johnson, 2011), we may be only getting part of the story about the work being done on the ground. Most likely, these sampled people are not involved in the actual operations of the IOs, which means that their opinions may not reflect what these IOs are doing in practice and, instead, reflect what the zeitgeist says about IOs. By asking people who work with the World Bank or

in a related area, we avoid some of this concern.

This project does not mean to suggest that only the presence or absence of contact with foreign-assistance workers drives recipients' assessment of the assistance. Other factors — chiefly, the quality and quantity of the assistance (e.g., Donini, 2007; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012) — shape assessments. Pleasant and humanizing encounters that yield partial or counterproductive results may do little to increase recipients' assessments. This project does suggest, however, that foreign assistance is more than just the facts on the ground (e.g., the number of deliverables disbursed). Alternatively put, we should appreciate the possibility that recipients will regard foreign assistance beyond the outputs; it is not only about what is being disbursed but what happens while it is being disbursed.

I approach foreign-assistance actors as if they exist in a dichotomy. A central part of the theory is that two groups exists, and these two groups are constituted by their role and status in foreign assistance. Crewe and Harrison caution against clear distinctions between "donor" and "recipient" and the treatment of these as if they were mutually exclusive categories (see also Malkki, 2015: 26). Some foreign-assistance workers from organizations are recipients in that they receive funds from states and other organizations to conduct their work (Girgis, 2007). Scholars have stressed the heterogeneity among foreign-assistance workers (e.g., da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012). For instance, differences exist between permanent workers, consultants, and volunteers in terms of prestige and compensation (McWha, 2011). Still, the categories of foreign-assistance worker and recipient are necessary if we want to both honor and interrogate the power relations and material inequalities within foreign assistance (Crewe & Harrison, 1998: 179). To discard these categories in analyses of foreign assistance "is to deny the concrete conditions under which [recipients] clearly are [recipients] and have shared experiences of both material and symbolic subordination" (Crewe & Harrison, 1998: 189). To think about interactions in foreign assistance without categories ignores the very real divide that exists between those who design or deliver assistance and those who receive it.

This paper joins others who have seemingly adopted a people-centric approach — or, at least, honored the possibility that people involved in foreign assistance contribute to its performance and effects. For instance, World Bank and Asian Development Bank projects with manager turnover receive lower ratings than do projects with consistent managers (Bulman, Kolkma, & Kraay, 2017). "While this finding is in some ways an intuitive one — project managers matter — it is one that is often overlooked in discussions of the importance of institutional rules and implementation agency quality" (Bulman, Kolkma, & Kraay, 2017: 361). Similarly, the presence of trust and communication among development-project partners has been linked to better outcomes (Diallo & Thuillier, 2005; McWha, 2011; Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006). These studies evidence the need to consider who is working in foreign assistance and how they engage with others in their role.

If, as my theory asserts, intergroup contact improves attitudes toward foreign-assistance workers, this means that interactions are sites where assessments of foreign assistance are made and that foreign-assistance workers are potential agents in this assessment-making (Gordon & Young, 2017). The organizations that employ and deploy foreign-assistance workers should prioritize formal initiatives and informal conversations about what this means. They can push for reflective thinking among their employees — getting them to think critically about what they are doing and how they are doing it (Rahnema, 1997; Fast, 2014: 241) — in order for ordinary meetings in foreign assistance to possess quality, variety, and depth (Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006). This act of problematizing their own practice (Eyben, 2003: 2) would mean acknowledging that these issues exist, exploring what they look like, and noting how they manifest (World Bank Group, 2015). To the extent that recipient attitudes are a priority, reflexivity should be condoned, if not celebrated, even if this clashes with other organizational imperatives. Additionally, as recent work shows, organizations' push for monitoring imposes a rigidity on foreign-assistance workers that curtails what they are able to achieve, especially in complex environments; the push for measurements and monitoring may force workers to sacrifice long-term quality for short-term quantification (Honig, 2018). Accordingly, organizations must consider how the directives they order and the quantifiable measures they expect limit the discretion of their workers.

Explosive encounters have gained scholarly and media attention (e.g., Egeland, Harmer, & Stoddard, 2011; Fast, 2010, 2014; Hoelscher, Miklian, & Nygård, 2017).[1] These violent, and sometimes lethal, encounters serve as strategic tools for warring parties to alter the dynamics of a conflict by eliminating the ideational or material resources that foreign-assistance workers can provide (Murdie & Stapley, 2014; Narang & Stanton, 2017). These attacks have appreciable significance, both politically and practically. They instill fear into foreign-assistance workers and elicit calls for greater security protocols to ensure their safety (Smirl, 2015). They can compel organizations to leave the spaces they were serving in order to prevent more casualties (see Fassin, 2012: chapter 9; Fast, 2014). Some have interrupted these events as a shift in norms, signaling that sometimes combatants reject what had been previously respected — that assistance workers are non-political actors (see Fast, 2014; chapter 6).

These explosive encounters have had implications for the possibility and productivity of interaction because the anticipation of danger — a direct effect of these encounters — has led to an increase in the securitization of foreign-aid spaces (Smirl, 2015). If interaction matters, as I assert it does, then this has implications for the spaces that inhibit or enhance the possibility of it happening. Organizations providing foreign assistance have increasingly routinized security features, adopting compounds, gated entries, guards,

[1]Examples of these explosive encounters include the 1996 murders at the Red Cross compound in Chechnya and the 2004 kidnapping and murder of Margaret Hassan, director of CARE International's operation in Iraq (see Fast, 2014).

and curfews that diminish the quantity and quality of interactions between workers and recipients (Fast, 2014; Smirl, 2015). The field's adoption of protective measures and arms-length approaches could make contact more precious precisely because these measures and approaches render it less likely to occur.

Yet while segregating promotes safety by cordoning off foreign-assistance workers from explosive encounters, it also prevents access to non-explosive ones. The structures that commonly constitute foreign-assistance spaces — compounds, SUVs, informal enclavic spaces — limit contact, both the explosive encounters to which attention has been paid and the nonstrategic but highly significant interactions I have explored. Regarding security concerns, interaction can facilitate information-sharing between foreign-assistance workers and recipients; the latter, for instance, can alert the former about rumors of attack (Fast et al., 2014; Gordon & Young, 2017). It is therefore important for organizations relying on certain security structures and measures to consider their non-obvious effects (e.g., how the structures that house foreign-assistance workers such as fortified compounds and measures like curfews ultimately divide them from the communities they serve). As a part of their security-management strategies, organizations should explore internal vulnerabilities as opposed to focusing exclusively on external threats (Fast, 2014). The securitization of foreign-assistance spaces has been regarded as "an unavoidable response to an exogenous decline in global security" (Duffield, 2012: 477). Yet, as Fast (2014: 211-212) has explored, the possibility exists that the securitization structures and measures provoke rather than contain tensions, even though they exist to cordon off danger rather than contribute to it.

Such a suggestion requires a critical reviewing of how foreign-assistance workers relate to the people they are sent to serve via the space they occupy — that is, how much and in what forms. It may also necessitate careful consideration, and possible revision, of the training materials, security measures, and material structures that seek to protect foreign-assistance workers. Some of the trouble stems from the tendency to place assumption over induction; by assuming the value of these measures rather than inducing them from the context, "risk becomes ubiquitous and normal rather than contextual and specific" (Fast, 2014: 215). These *a priori* assumptions about risk may thwart creative approaches that appreciate the context of a place requiring foreign assistance, "render[ing] the practice more bureaucratic and static as opposed to flexible and responsive to the suffering of others" (Fast, 2014: 185). It is no easy task to honor, on the one hand, the need for sustained interaction between foreign-assistance workers and recipients and, on the other, the imperative to ensure workers' security. The fate of meaningful, secure foreign assistance may hinge on the ability of organizations to manage both.

Many compelling works document and explain dysfunctions that can accompany foreign assistance, discussing them despite the good intentions of the architects and implementers (e.g., Autesserre, 2014: 4-5; da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012: 54; Dunn, 2017: 21; Kennedy, 2004; McMahon, 2017: 4, 12; Rahmena, 1997). My

project reframes this, asking not what happens *despite* these good intentions but what can transpire *because of* them. The possession of these good intentions by the average foreign-assistance worker matter for the interactions to improve, not worsen, recipient assessments.

These good intentions can be powerful. Malkki (2015) studies the domestic facets of international humanitarianism such as knitted handicrafts made to comfort children abroad — items generally relegated to the periphery — and treats them as something to study about giving and neediness. These objects are regarded as mere, "[b]ut we should not be too quick to suppose that we know what such practices do, or that *we know they do nothing*" (Malkki, 2015: 202, emphasis in original). In a similar vein, this project invests in interactions — and the actions taken within them — to explain attitudes toward foreign assistance. If this paper's contention is true, then it matters who is doing the work on the ground; it also matters how they treat the people they are sent to assist.

Appendix

TABLE 4: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank's 2012 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, (29 countries)

Country	**Individuals Invited to Participate**	**Participated (%)**
Afghanistan	500	397 (79.4)
Albania	342	198 (57.9)
Angola	583	119 (20.4)
Argentina	279	104 (37.3)
Benin	687	600 (87.3)
Bulgaria	405	173 (42.7)
Burundi	581	325 (55.9)
Central African Republic	650	322 (49.5)
China	518	207 (40.0)
Congo, Republic of	402	361 (89.8)
Croatia	694	198 (28.5)
Djibouti	220	118 (53.6)
Ethiopia	620	326 (52.6)
Gambia	250	150 (60.0)
India	1,445	260 (18.0)
Indonesia	866	265 (30.6)
Kenya	600	373 (62.2)
Laos	1,017	523 (52.3)
Mauritania	215	110 (51.2)
Mauritius	303	153 (50.5)
Morocco	310	96 (31.0)
Nicaragua	328	240 (73.2)
Pakistan	1,000	512 (51.2)
Sao Tome and Principe	125	200 (62.5)
South Africa	481	69 (14.3)
Sri Lanka	550	296 (53.8)
Sudan	296	152 (51.4)
Tunisia	133	58 (43.6)
Zambia	553	312 (56.4)

TABLE 5: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank's 2013 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, (41 countries)

Country	**Individuals Invited to Participate**	**Participated (%)**
Armenia	213	192 (90.1)
Azerbaijan	NA	173 (NA)
Bangladesh	701	366 (52.2)
Belarus	190	115 (60.5)
Bhutan	205	132 (64.4)
Botswana	300	241 (80.3)
Brazil	10,200	200 (2.0)
Burkina Faso	517	329 (63.6)
Cameroon	571	403 (70.6)
Colombia	665	271 (40.8)
Comoros	150	126 (84.0)
Democratic Republic of the Congo	400	331 (82.8)
Dominican Republic	505	275 (54.4)
Georgia	276	162 (58.7)
Guatemala	90	62 (68.9)
Guinea	513	383 (74.7)
Honduras	300	130 (43.3)
Jamaica	160	108 (67.5)
Jordan	254	132 (52.0)
Kosovo	204	101 (49.5)
Kyrgyzstan	300	166 (55.3)
Lebanon	574	196 (34.1)
Malawi	600	427 (71.2)
Malaysia	287	74 (25.8)
Moldova	378	303 (80.2)
Montenegro	201	110 (54.7)
Namibia	314	90 (28.7)
Nepal	410	310 (75.6)
Niger	300	194 (64.7)
Nigeria	858	835 (97.3)
Panama	281	51 (18.1)
Paraguay	260	152 (58.5)
Philippines	1,536	328 (21.4)
Poland	278	92 (33.1)
Romania	191	81 (42.4)
Rwanda	826	714 (86.4)
Sierra Leone	600	340 (56.7)
South Sudan	300	191 (63.7)
Thailand	315	110 (34.9)
Uzbekistan	253	147 (58.1)
West Bank and Gaza	353	119 (33.7)

TABLE 6: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank's 2014 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, (35 countries)

Country	**Individuals Invited to Participate**	**Participated (%)**
Bolivia	440	210 (47.7)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	300	109 (36.3)
Costa Rica	310	127 (41.0)
Cote d'Ivoire	500	288 (57.6)
El Salvador	135	97 (71.9)
Gabon	250	222 (88.8)
Ghana	1,000	830 (83.0)
Guinea-Bissau	279	183 (65.6)
Haiti	409	204 (50.0)
Kazakhstan	372	192 (51.6)
Lesotho	142	106 (74.6)
Liberia	700	639 (91.3)
Macedonia	23,843	1,171 (4.9)
Madagascar	201	101 (50.2)
Maldives	300	104 (34.7)
Mali	751	260 (34.6)
Mexico	400	191 (47.8)
Mongolia	520	357 (68.7)
Mozambique	304	180 (59.2)
Myanmar	662	173 (26.1)
Papua New Guinea	463	150 (32.4)
Peru	465	197 (42.4)
Russia	393	139 (35.4)
Senegal	2,826	269 (9.5)
Serbia	642	253 (39.4)
Swaziland	300	142 (47.3)
Tajikistan	475	272 (57.3)
Tanzania	318	277 (87.1)
Timor-Leste	220	163 (74.1)
Turkey	742	279 (37.6)
Uganda	600	326 (54.3)
Uruguay	331	156 (47.1)
Vietnam	1,032	501 (48.5)
Yemen	600	296 (49.3)
Zimbabwe	246	183 (74.3)

TABLE 7: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank's 2015 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, (32 countries)

Country	**Individuals Invited to Participate**	**Participated (%)**
Afghanistan	500	407 (81.4)
Angola	386	91 (23.6)
Bahrain	139	40 (28.8)
Benin	545	442 (81.1)
Bulgaria	495	183 (37.0)
Burundi	312	209 (67.0)
Cabo Verde	272	107 (39.3)
Chad	401	277 (69.1)
Chile	486	49 (10.1)
China	570	184 (32.3)
Congo, Republic of	370	265 (71.6)
Croatia	871	175 (20.1)
Djibouti	304	191 (62.8)
Ethiopia	290	146 (50.3)
Gambia	657	274 (41.7)
India	580	263 (45.3)
Indonesia	1,089	316 (29.0)
Kenya	646	558 (86.4)
Kuwait	231	74 (32.0)
Laos	657	296 (45.1)
Mauritania	393	204 (51.9)
Mauritius	250	130 (52.0)
Oman	206	59 (28.6)
Pakistan	1,240	262 (21.1)
Sao Tome and Principe	361	290 (80.3)
Solomon Islands	86	55 (64.0)
South Africa	203	83 (40.9)
Sri Lanka	600	302 (50.3)
Sudan	439	273 (62.2)
Tunisia	763	202 (26.5)
United Arab Emirates	220	40 (18.2)
Zambia	546	304 (55.7)

TABLE 8: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the World Bank's 2016 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program, (39 countries)

Country	**Individuals Invited to Participate**	**Participated (%)**
Argentina	208	90 (43.3)
Bangladesh	700	332 (47.4)
Bhutan	181	102 (56.4)
Bolivia	600	230 (38.3)
Botswana	300	256 (85.3)
Brazil	561	248 (44.2)
Burkina Faso	571	413 (72.3)
Cameroon	607	394 (64.9)
Colombia	745	186 (25.0)
Comoros	160	134 (84.0)
Costa Rica	475	171 (36.0)
Dominican Republic	624	201 (32.2)
Egypt	600	278 (46.3)
Georgia	308	166 (54.0)
Guatemala	367	279 (76.0)
Guinea	492	384 (78.0)
Honduras	360	180 (50.0)
Jamaica	244	91 (37.3)
Jordan	318	85 (26.7)
Kosovo	240	105 (43.8)
Kyrgyzstan	479	322 (67.2)
Lebanon	403	254 (63.0)
Macedonia	398	206 (51.8)
Malawi	500	340 (68.0)
Malaysia	871	258 (29.6)
Mexico	488	164 (33.6)
Moldova	528	255 (48.3)
Montenegro	216	126 (58.3)
Nepal	481	324 (67.4)
Niger	270	229 (84.8)
Nigeria	520	510 (98.1)
Panama	332	160 (48.2)
Paraguay	302	184 (60.9)
Peru	562	209 (37.2)
Philippines	2,230	352 (15.8)
Romania	454	105 (23.1)
Rwanda	400	254 (63.5)
Turkmenistan	85	57 (67.1)
Uzbekistan	303	156 (51.5)

TABLE 9: Survey Invitations and Response by Country in the Afrobarometer 2002-2003 (16 countries)[2]

Country	**Individuals Invited to Participate**	**Participated (%)**
Botswana	1,559	1,200 (77.0)
Cabo Verde	1,518	1,268 (83.5)
Ghana	1,263	1,200 (95.0)
Kenya	4,018	2,398 (59.7)
Lesotho	1,313	1,200 (91.4)
Malawi	1,480	1,200 (81.1)
Mali	1,401	1,283 (91.6)
Mozambique	1,465	1,400 (95.6)
Namibia	1,920	1,199 (62.4)
Nigeria	3,960	2,428 (61.3)
Senegal	NA	1,147 (NA)
South Africa	3,520	2,400 (68.2)
Tanzania	1,241	1,223 (98.5)
Uganda	3,058	2,400 (78.5)
Zambia	1,372	1,198 (87.3)
Zimbabwe	1,555	1,104 (71.0)

[2]For these numbers, see http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles. The reported response rate for Senegal was 94.4% based on 1,271 invited and 1,200 participated, but this does not match the number of Senegalese in the data (n = 1,147).

FIGURE 9: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2012 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program (Minimum of 0.21, Maximum of 0.77)



Although 29 countries were included in the 2012 COS Program, five did not ask about respondent collaboration (China, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Mauritania, and Sri Lanka).

FIGURE 10: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2013 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program (Minimum of 0.11, Maximum of 0.81)



FIGURE 11: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2014 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program (Minimum of 0.13, Maximum of 0.74)



FIGURE 12: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2015 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program (Minimum of 0.18, Maximum of 0.88)



Middle East refers to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, which the COS Program grouped together, precluding disaggregation by country for these four.

FIGURE 13: Collaboration with the World Bank Varies by Country in the 2016 Country Opinion Survey (COS) Program (Minimum of 0.12, Maximum of 0.64)



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